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Abstract:  
Contrary to the common claim that jus in bello proportionality is an obscure and 
intractable principle of modern warfare, this paper shows that proportionality 
balancing has a central role to play in assuring efficient military operations with 
a minimum number of casualties. Military commanders can and should want to 
understand proportionality as a requirement to measure military advantage in 
terms of lives saved and direct their operations toward the most life-saving 
operations. The targeted killing context in particular highlights the advantage of 
making proportionality analysis a central component of military strategy in 
asymmetrical conflicts. 
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 CHALLENGING THE PERPLEXITY OVER JUS IN BELLO I.
PROPORTIONALITY 
 
This paper calls into question the central thesis that is ubiquitous in 
discussions of jus in bello proportionality: that the demand to balance 
military advantage and injury to civilians is extraordinarily difficult 
because we are asked to balance two incommensurable values.1 The most 
                                                            
* Yale Law School. 
1 As Gabriella Blum has recently written: “Much has been written on the indeterminacy 
of the principle of proportionality and on the unworkable test of comparing the 
incommensurable values of military advantage and civilian lives.” Gabriella Blum, ‘On a 
Differential Law of War’ (2011)52 Harv. Int. Law J. 163, 189. See, eg Aaron Fellmeth, 
‘The Proportionality Principle in Operation’, (2012)45 Israel L.R. 125, 127. 
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simple response to this claim would be to point out that the hallmark of 
legal practice today is balancing incommensurable values, e.g. privacy and 
free speech 2  or freedom of religion and national security. 3  Thus 
proportionality balancing cannot be extraordinarily difficult simply 
because it requires us to balance two incommensurable values. We 
balance incommensurable values all the time.  
 
Such a response would be too facile, however, and would overlook the 
fact that there are, in fact, two theses embedded in the claim: that jus in 
bello proportionality imposes a particularly arduous burden and that it 
asks us to balance two incommensurable things. I want to show that both 
of these claims are false. Proportionality balancing is challenging, 
particularly as the state of theory now stands. However, unlike abstract 
values such as privacy, free speech, or religious freedom, proportionality 
asks us to measure and compare concrete things. If proportionality is 
approached as I will suggest it ought to be, it has the distinct possibility of 
being much more straightforward than other routine instances of legal 
balancing. 
 
Jus in bello proportionality is all the more approachable when we 
recognise that its two prongs are far more commensurable that we might 
at first imagine. Preventing the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and 
damage to civilian objects is one of the central, if not the central, reasons 
for use of military force today. In a world where no state will use violent 
military force in the name of acquisition of territory or spoils, the only 
legitimate uses of force are defensive, to end conflict and restore peace 
and security. As the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual puts it, ‘[t]he moral purpose of combat operations is to secure 
peace.’ 4  If we fight today to secure peace, then military advantage, 
particularly in the counterterrorism context, should be thought about 
explicitly in terms of preventing harm and saving lives.  
 
 
                                                            
2 Eg C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD, decision of 13 May 2014, nyr. 
3 Eg W Virginia State Bd of Educ v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943). 
4 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 2006 [hereinafter COIN], 7-
26. 
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Central to making proportionality analysis more concrete is showing that 
targeted killing and counterterrorism generally will be more successful if 
military advantage is approached in terms of saving lives. The traditional 
approach to thinking of military advantage in terms of depletion and 
attrition may have little or no place in the asymmetric conflicts fought 
against transnational terrorist networks where neither a peace treaty nor 
unconditional surrender is likely to be forthcoming. Indeed, attacks that 
temporarily deplete the enemy but also kill civilians or only low-level enemy 
combatants may have a negative military advantage by serving to bolster 
enemy ranks.5 As the COIN Field Manual insightfully notes, some actions 
that ‘provide a short-term military advantage’ may actually ‘help the enemy.’6 
Identifying those military actions that will actually shorten conflicts and save 
lives requires a more intelligent approach to military advantage than 
attention to attrition and depletion can provide. 
 
In the first part of the paper, I lay out the requirements of proportionality 
and show that nearly every nation, particularly those frequently involved 
in armed conflicts, has committed itself to jus in bello proportionality in 
treaty obligations, written the rule of proportionality into military manuals, 
and publically espoused adherence to proportionality. In the second part 
of the paper, I show that despite nearly universal recognition of 
proportionality as a central limitation on war, official legal assessments of 
proportionality characterise the rule as vague and indeterminate, 
effectively rendering proportionality an empty rule of warfare. In the third 
part of the paper, I set out an approach to proportionality that enables a 
more concrete application of the principle through a more rigorous 
approach to military advantage and the value of human lives. Once we see 
that military advantage can only be defined in relation to political goals, 
the value of a particular operation becomes much easier to measure and 
balance against harm to civilian lives. In conclusion, I discuss the extent 
to which the approach to proportionality sketched here can be applied 
more broadly to asymmetrical and conventional conflicts. 
                                                            
5 As U.S. State Dept. spokesperson, Richard Boucher, said over a decade ago: “Israel 
needs to understand that targeted killings of Palestinians don’t end the violence but are 
only inflaming an already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm.” 
Jane Perlez, ‘U.S. Says Killings by Israel Inflame Mideast Conflict,’ New York Times, 
28th August 2001. 
6 COIN (n 4), A-28. See also A-37, 38. 
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 THE UNIVERSAL ACCEPTANCE OF PROPORTIONALITY II.
 
The modern principle of proportionality was initially codified in the first 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 7  Article 51 prohibits 
attacks ‘which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.’8 The principle of proportionality is a procedural 
requirement on those engaged in hostilities designed to temper the 
perceived demands of military necessity where civilian casualties can be 
anticipated. It presupposes the identification and distinguishing 
requirements of the principle of distinction 9  and adds an additional 
requirement to measure and compare the anticipated military advantage 
and anticipated civilian casualties.  
 
The jus in bello requirement of proportionality has received almost 
universal acceptance, with 174 nations ratifying the first Additional 
Protocol and several non-ratifying nations, including the US and Israel, 
explicitly acknowledging their acceptance of proportionality as binding 
customary international law. Dozens of nations have taken the further 
step of directly writing the requirements of proportionality into their 
military manuals and rules of engagement. 10  For instance, the United 
States Air Force Doctrine Document, Targeting, states that: 
 
The ‘law of war’ is a term encompassing all international law for the 
conduct of hostilities binding on the United States including treaties and 
                                                            
7 Many trace jus in bello proportionality to the Lieber Code, which allowed for “all direct 
destruction of life and limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction 
is incidentally unavoidable […]” Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, Art. 15, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General 
Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24th April 1863. 
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, Art. 51(4) & 51(5)(b) 
[hereinafter: AP I]. Cf. AP I, Arts. 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(b); the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
9 AP I Art. 48. See also Arts. 44(3), 48, 51(3), 51(5)(a), 52(2), 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(3). 
10 See the ICRC’s Customary IHL, ‘Practice Relating to Rule 14. Proportionality in 
Attack,’ available at www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule14_sectiona, 
accessed 12.01.2015. 
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international agreements to which the United States is a party, and 
applicable customary international law.11  
 
The Air Force goes on to specify that ‘[t]argeting must adhere to the [law 
of war]’ which ‘rests on four fundamental principles that are inherent to 
all targeting decisions,’ among which are ‘proportionality’ and 
‘distinction.’ 12  Moreover, Targeting defines the ‘Role of the Judge 
Advocate’ as including ‘an affirmative duty to provide legal advice to 
commanders and their staffs that is consistent with the international and 
domestic legal obligations.’13 Military lawyers are required to make a legal 
evaluation of distinction and proportionality before any strike. While 
commanders my override the judge advocate’s recommendation, 
commanders are still bound to adhere to the laws of distinction and 
proportionality. 
 
The requirements set out in the Air Force’s Targeting document have 
been echoed by U.S. officials. In April 2012, then Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan, 
in his remarks on the U.S.’s counterterrorism strategy stated that 
‘[t]argeted strikes conform to the principle of proportionality—the notion 
that the anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in 
relation to the anticipated military advantage.’14 In March 2010, then Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. State Department, Harold Koh, stated in his address 
to the American Society of International Law: 
 
[T]he principles of distinction and proportionality that the United States 
applies are not just recited at meetings. They are implemented rigorously 
throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure 
that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable 
law.15 
                                                            
11 United States Air Force Doctrine Document, Targeting, 88. (emphasis added) 
12 ibid. The other two principles are military necessity and unnecessary suffering, or 
‘humanity.; 
13 Targeting (n 11) 95. 
14  John O Brennan, ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism 
Strategy,’ remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 
Washington, DC on 30th April 2012. 
15 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law,’ remarks at 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC 25th 
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Given the nearly universal acceptance of proportionality and claim by the 
world’s most active militaries that they diligently apply and respect it, we 
might expect to find rich and detailed accounts of precisely what 
proportionality demands. One of the most disturbing contradictions in 
discussions of proportionality today is that the nearly universal 
subscription to it as a fundamental law of armed conflict is coupled with 
the claim that its demands are fundamentally unclear and difficult or 
impossible to apply in practice. Thus the most extensive legal discussion 
of jus in bello proportionality, the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, found that ‘[t]he main problem with 
the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but what it 
means and how it is to be applied.’16 Unfortunately, the NATO Bombing 
Report is not exceptional in finding the requirements of proportionality 
essentially vague and open to divergent interpretations.17 As we will now 
see, proportionality has appeared vague and indeterminate primarily 
because the two elements it requires us to measure and balance, military 
advantage and civilian lives, have never been subjected to rigorous 
analysis. 
  
 THE PERPLEXITY OVER PROPORTIONALITY III.
 
The two most extensive legal discussions of proportionality stand in sharp 
contrast to the widespread affirmative commitment to proportionality, 
suggesting that it is not much more than a legal fiction. The NATO 
Bombing Report describes the problem thus: 
 
It is much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general 
terms than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the 
comparison is often between unlike quantities and values. One cannot 
easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a 
particular military objective.18 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
March 2010. 
16 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, [48-50]. 
17 ibid, [50]. 
18 ibid, [48]. 
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In addition to locating the difficulty in the purported incommensurability 
of military advantage and civilian lives, the Report identifies a number of 
factors that remain under-theorized, but necessary, for assessments of 
proportionality. These include how to value military advantage and 
civilian casualties, how narrowly the assessment should be made in time 
and space, and to what extent a commander has an obligation to expose 
his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties. 19 
Unfortunately, the Report makes no attempt to resolve any of these 
questions by formulating legal standards or tests. Rather, the Report 
effectively throws up its hands and offers only the platitude that “[t]he 
answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve 
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on 
the background and values of the decision maker.”20 
 
The lack of definite criteria by which to evaluate the proportionality of an 
attack is also reflected in the recent German Fuel Tankers case. The case 
arose after a German colonel ordered an airstrike on two fuel tanker 
trucks that had been stolen by members of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By 
the time the trucks were bombed, however, the Taliban had abandoned 
them and the tanker trucks were surrounded by civilians syphoning off 
fuel for their own use. As a result, the bombs killed or severely injured 
more than one hundred civilians. Attempting to determine whether the 
attack on the tanker trucks was proportionate, the German Federal Court 
of Justice found that: 
 
Even if the killing of several dozen civilians would have had to be 
anticipated (which is assumed here for the sake of the argument), from a 
tactical-military perspective this would not have been out of proportion 
to the anticipated military advantages. The literature consistently points 
out that general criteria are not available for the assessment of specific 
proportionality because unlike legal goods, values and interests are juxtaposed 
which cannot be “balanced.” Therefore, considering the particular pressure 
at the moment when the decision had to be taken, an infringement is 
only to be assumed in cases of obvious excess where the commander 
ignored any considerations of proportionality and refrained from acting 
                                                            
19 ibid, [49]. 
20 ibid, [50]. 
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“honestly,” “reasonably,” and “competently.” This would apply to the 
destruction of an entire village with hundreds of civilian inhabitants in 
order to hit a single enemy fighter, but not if the objective was to destroy 
artillery positions in the village. There is no such obvious 
disproportionality in the present case. Both the destruction of the fuel 
tankers and the destruction of high-level Taliban had a military 
importance which is not to be underestimated, not least because of the 
thereby considerably reduced risk of attacks by the Taliban against own 
troops and civilians. There is thus no excess.21 
 
The Court rehearses the common refrain that proportionality cannot be 
assessed in specific instances because proportionality asks us to balance 
two incommensurable values. It goes on to draw the logical inference that 
proportionality is an all but empty requirement that would be violated 
only where a commander appears to ignore proportionality altogether. 
Given the claim that proportionality is essentially vague and 
indeterminate, it is difficult to understand why it would impose any legal 
requirement on commanders at all. It is thus particularly surprising that 
the Court unequivocally finds not only that there was no excessive civilian 
casualties in the bombing of the fuel tanker trucks, but that there are 
other clear cases in which civilian casualties could be judged as excessive 
or justified. 
 
There are clearly several elements of the Fuel Tankers case that do not add 
up. Aside from the obvious result of reducing disproportionate attacks to 
wholly indiscriminate attacks and thus making the proportionality 
requirement superfluous, a legal system that routinely balances 
incommensurate values in other contexts seems to overstate the hardship 
of balancing military advantage and civilian casualties. 22  As we have 
already seen, even if military advantage and civilian casualties have no 
common denominator, there is no reason to think they could not be 
                                                            
21 Germany, Federal Court of Justice, the Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, 
Decision, 16th April 2010, 66 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
22 Among some of the well known cases from the German Constitutional Court are 
BVerfGE 7, 198  (the “Lüth”-decision): balancing free speech vs. “right to 
personality”/personal honour; BVerfGE 90, 145 (“Cannabis-Urteil”): balancing general 
liberty to consume drugs vs. public health; and BVerfGE 104, 337 (on halal slaughter of 
animals): balancing religious freedom vs. animal rights. 
27   European Journal of Legal Studies                [Vol.7 No.2 
 
balanced in the way that other apparently incommensurable values are 
balanced in constitutional rights cases. Second, the opinion conflates the 
legal standard of proportionality with the evidentiary requirements of 
holding someone criminally liable for its violation. While it may be right 
to think that criminal liability should be reserved only for the most 
egregious violations of the law, there is no reason to think that the criteria 
of criminal liability define the threshold of proportionality violations. 
There may well be a range of violations of proportionality for which 
damages or reparations rather than criminal liability is the appropriate 
response.23 
 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Fuel Tankers judgment is that, 
despite having abjured the possibility of assessing proportionality in 
specific cases, the court is quite prepared to pronounce both on the case 
at hand and its own hypotheticals. But here it is not at all apparent on 
what principles or criteria the court is relying. What makes bombing a 
village to kill a sniper excessive? What if the sniper reliably could be 
anticipated to kill hundreds of soldiers and civilians in the coming 
months? Likewise, what makes the court so sure that the destruction of 
artillery positions would warrant killing hundreds of civilians in the 
village? It seems the court is relying on the vague notion that artillery are 
generally capable of more destruction than a single sniper. That seems 
reasonable enough. The question, however, is what makes the killing of 
hundreds of civilians excessive in one case but not in the other. Here the 
court seems to resort to no more than a vague feeling. We do not know 
why, but we are convinced killing hundreds of civilians to kill a sniper is 
disproportionate. Likewise, we do not quite know why, but we might 
more readily accept the same number of civilian deaths to eliminate 
artillery positions. Under its ‘vague feel’ standard, the court suggests, only 
‘cases of obvious excess’ could allow us to infer that the commander failed 
to fulfill the minimal requirements.  
 
The problem with this approach is not only that it lowers the bar of 
proportionality to making a mere consideration rather than an actual 
                                                            
23 See ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines of the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for 
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.’ General 
Assembly Resolution 60/147 (16th December 2005). 
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assessment, it also renders entirely opaque just how cases of obvious 
excess can be identified. The Court offers no account of what would make 
one attack clearly excessive and another not. There is thus no way to 
assess its ultimate finding that the death or severe injury of over one 
hundred civilians in the bombing of two stolen fuel tanker trucks 
exhibited ‘no excess.’ Although neither the German military nor the 
government admitted wrongdoing, the government did subsequently 
agree to a settlement of roughly $5,000 to each victim’s family.24 It would 
thus seem, at the very least, that the German government felt it made a 
mistake in assessing the relative value of military advantage and civilian 
casualties. Presumably, if military commanders had known the tankers 
were abandoned by the Taliban and surrounded by civilians, they would 
have called off the airstrike. But the Court suggests that even if several 
dozen civilian casualties had been anticipated, the strike still would not 
have violated proportionality. Yet the Court offers no way to even begin to 
draw the line between cases of ‘obvious excess’ and cases of ‘no excess.’     
 
Military commanders can and should want to do better. War will be 
fought more successfully and efficiently if military advantage is well 
articulated and enemy civilians are not disproportionately harmed by 
attacks. In the remainder of this paper I want to show how the values of 
military advantage and civilian casualties can be analysed and balanced. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING AND BALANCING MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND IV.
CIVILIAN LIVES 
 
As we have seen, jus in bello proportionality prohibits attacks  
 
[W]hich may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.25  
 
                                                            
24  Matthias Gebauer, ‘Aftermath of an Afghanistan Tragedy’ (Spiegel Online 
International) <www.spiegel.de/international/germany/aftermath-of-an-afghanistan-
tragedy-germany-to-pay-500-000-for-civilian-bombing-victims-a-710439.html> accessed 
15.12.2014. 
25 AP I, Art. 51(4) & 51(5)(b). 
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Proportionality is a principle designed both to protect civilians in armed 
conflict and to foster accountability by establishing a mechanism that 
guides military commanders to take account of both anticipated civilian 
casualties and military gains before conducting an operation. Military 
forces are thus barred from undertaking military operations absent some 
(quantifiable) assessment of what is at stake in the operation itself. As 
with military necessity, when the survival of a state is truly at issue, as was 
arguably the case for many European nations during World War II, 
anything that weakens the military capability of the enemy could bolster 
military advantage. However, outside of a ‘total war’ where the survival of 
a nation is not seriously in question, we must know what the goals of the 
use of force are in order to know what serves military advantage. In the 
age of the U.N. Charter, uses of military force are supposed to be for the 
purpose of restoring peace and security. 26  As is particularly clear for 
targeted killings in counter terrorism operations, the elimination of 
terrorist threats is for the purpose of saving lives. A strike that merely 
damages the enemy but has no anticipated effect of saving lives or 
restoring peace and security may not have any positive military advantage. 
Because the military advantage of a targeted killing is fundamentally 
linked to saving lives, I will argue that what at first appears to be a 
balancing of two incommensurable values, military advantage and 
excessive civilian casualties, actually has a common denominator at least 
in cases of targeted killing, if not in most conflicts today.  
 
Before looking more closely at the two prongs of proportionality, it will be 
useful to clarify some of its technical aspects. First, actual results are not 
what is in question: ‘The legal question is the relationship between 
expected harm and anticipated advantage in the operation as planned, not 
                                                            
26 This is not to say that the many other coercive measures deployed in international 
relations today are or should be guided primarily by considerations of peace and 
security. A variety of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ may be used, for instance, in economic trade 
negotiations or environmental treaty negotiations, as well as for direct peace and 
security interests. However, when military force is deployed, with it immediately 
destructive and violent effects, it is acceptable today only when peace and security 
interests are directly at stake. Thus military force for economic gain, or to coerce 
another state into joining an environmental treaty, or even to coerce a state into joining 
a sanctioning regime, is fundamentally unacceptable. 
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that which eventuated.’27 Second, proportionality analysis is based on a 
reasonableness standard. As the ICTY held in Galić, the question is 
‘whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the 
actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to 
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from 
the attack.’ 28  Third, giving an account of the anticipated military 
advantage and civilian causalities depends on having already identified 
and distinguished military from civilian targets. The military target must 
then be connected to a military advantage by giving a credible account of 
how a particular attack, such as an attack on a line of communication, will 
yield a concrete military advantage. While giving a credible explanation in 
a conventional conflict may be relatively straightforward, targeted strikes 
in a counter-terrorism operation do not adhere to the same logics of 
depletion and attrition.  Killing one terrorist may well spawn two new 
ones, particularly if injuries to civilians and minors are involved.29 The 
U.S. military states the new approach succinctly in their 2006 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual:  
 
[T]he number of civilian lives lost and property destroyed needs to be 
measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could do if 
allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively inconsequential, 
then proportionality requires combatants to forego severe action, or seek 
non-combative means of engagement.30 
 
As with counterinsurgency, a different approach to proportionality is 
needed in the targeted killing context, one that accounts for the 
anticipated lives saved and lives lost on each side. 
 
Once military targets have been identified and expected civilian casualties 
assessed, expected military advantage must be weighed against civilian 
losses. As we have seen, many practitioners and scholars presume that 
                                                            
27 Michael Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance,’ 50 Va J Intl L 795, 825 (2010). 
28 Case No. IT-98-29-T Prosecutor v Galić, Judgement and Opinion, [58] (ICTY, 5th 
December 2003).  
29 Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann refer to this phenomenon as the ‘Hydra effect.’ 
See ‘Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,’ (2010) 1 Harv Nat’l Sec J 145, 165. 
30 COIN (n 4), [7-32]. 
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any hope for a rigorous balancing of military advantage and civilian losses 
necessarily gives way to a vague assessment of incommensurables. For 
example, Michael Schmitt argues that it is wrong to understand 
proportionality analysis as balancing. He explains that the test calls us to 
focus on excessiveness in order to 
 
[A]void […] the legal fiction that collateral damage, incidental injury, and 
military advantage can be precisely measured. Ultimately, the issue is 
reasonableness in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time…. and 
nothing more.31  
 
Schmitt’s analysis is misleading, particularly in the context of modern 
warfare. It is true that civilian casualties and military advantage can only 
be estimated using methods and criteria that must ultimately be judged 
for their reasonableness. However, modern technology and data analysis 
can and should be employed to enable proportionality analysis that rests 
on more than a vague feeling of the commander. For example, given the 
hundreds of drone strikes carried out in the last decade, data on civilian 
casualties, militant casualties, threats avoided, and increases or decreases 
in enemy numbers can and should be brought to bear on proportionality 
assessments. Doing so will not only enable more rigorous compliance 
with proportionality, it will also enable militaries to use force more 
effectively. Given limited resources and budget constraints, more effective 
use of force through data-driven assessment of military advantage should 
be attractive to any military.  
  
As the discussion thus far has sought to highlight, proportionality analysis 
has been notorious for its difficulty largely because we lack a systematic 
approach to assessing military advantage and the value of civilian lives. As 
with any hard problem, much of the difficulty can be mitigated by 
identifying the component variables and understanding how they interact. 
In the case of military advantage, we can identify three central variables. 
First, the anticipated military advantage must be measured in terms of the 
value of eliminating the target in question. If, say, the target is Hitler and 
the data show that killing him will likely shorten the conflict considerably 
and save hundreds of thousands of lives, then killing him will have very 
                                                            
31 Michael Schmitt, Essays on Law and War at the Fault Lines (Springer 2012), 190. 
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significant military advantage. Second, the anticipated military advantage 
must be adjusted for likelihood of success. If the advantage of killing 
Hitler by aerial bombardment during WWII would have been great, but 
the likelihood of success miniscule, then the assessment of anticipated 
military advantage must be adjusted accordingly. That is, one cannot 
assess anticipated military advantage based on the unrealistic 
presupposition of 100% success rate for an operation. Third, the 
anticipated military advantage should be assessed on a scale of anticipated 
opportunity from unique or very limited, to highly repeatable. Unique 
opportunities to strike a military target will have greater military 
advantage than strike opportunities that are standing or which are 
anticipated to recur frequently in the future.  
 
An assessment of military advantage that takes each of these three 
variables into account will enable a reliable measure of how many lives 
are likely to be saved by carrying out a particular strike. Moreover, 
accounting for these variables should not place any additional burden on 
military targeting than what is already accepted. The language 
surrounding U.S. targeted killing, for example, is replete with references 
to ‘high value targets,’ assessments of uniqueness of opportunity, and a 
recognition that not all strikes will be successful. By making these 
valuations explicit in the assessment of military advantage, commanders 
will have a more concrete sense of the lives at stake in the choice of 
targets and be able to channel their resources most effectively. 
 
The valuation of civilian casualties requires at least as much clarification 
as the valuation of military advantage. Focusing just on civilian deaths for 
the moment, it is a daunting task to assess the value of human lives. It is 
helpful to bear in mind, however, that the actors bound by 
proportionality will be, in principle, engaged in defensive war designed 
ultimately to save civilian lives and property. Given that the intent of 
defensive war is protection of a state’s own people, there are two relatively 
straightforward principles that should govern proportionality assessments. 
The first is an adaptation of crude utilitarian principles that sidesteps a 
direct valuation of human life and proceeds directly to the weighing of 
relative outcomes. Given that military targeting is designed to weaken the 
enemy and bring hostilities more quickly to a close, commanders should 
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ask how many lives the strike in question can be anticipated to save by 
bringing the conflict to a swifter end or by eliminating a terrorist threat 
likely to harm fellow civilians or military personnel. I acknowledge that in 
many instances such a calculation may only be made with limited 
certainty and approximation. However, in the targeted killing context, an 
assessment of the number of lives saved by eliminating a particular threat 
is essential to identifying and prioritizing the most significant threats. 
Moreover, in many instances such a calculation will not be prohibitively 
difficult. For a state engaged in a defensive war, data on rates of their own 
civilian and military casualties resulting from the armed conflict should 
be readily available. The anticipated military advantage should, in turn, 
relate to some assessment of the length of time the conflict is likely to be 
shortened by the strike, adjusted for likelihood of success. The 
consequent shortening can then be compared to the rates of civilian and 
military deaths. Thus on a crude utilitarian calculation, if the anticipated 
shortening of the conflict would save 20 civilian and military lives (at 
present rates of loss), then it would be excessive to kill 21 or more civilian 
lives in the process. Thus, if 21 or more civilian deaths are anticipated, the 
rule of proportionality in this case would dictate abandoning the strike. 
 
The first utilitarian principle that I have outlined is a good starting 
criterion, but may give way to bias toward one’s own civilians or military 
personnel and a desire to shift the risk onto foreigners with whom we feel 
no relation. The principles of distinction and proportionality are 
supposed to check those biases. It is for that reason that we must recall 
what lies at the basis of protecting civilian lives. Just as we no longer 
embrace the ‘Napoleonic dictum that soldiers “are made to be killed,”’32 
we are no longer supposed to embrace the total war doctrine that civilians 
in enemy territory can be sacrificed en masse to save our fellow civilians. 
Thus, I want to suggest that at the basis of the law of war today is 
recognition of the inherent value, or dignity, of all human lives. We do 
not seek to save lives because they are our own, a logic that would apply 
better to cattle than to humans today. Rather we seek to save lives because 
we recognise their inherent dignity. As such, the second principle that 
should govern the assessment of loss of human life in the proportionality 
                                                            
32 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War,’ (2013)24 EJIL 315, 
321.  
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calculation is an adaptation of the Golden Rule that also sidesteps a direct 
valuation of life and instead focuses on the targeting community’s own 
assessment of acceptable civilian death. There are at least two important 
implications of this principle. First, as in the utilitarian calculus, those 
contemplating the strike are required to value the lives of enemy civilians 
to the same extent that they value the lives of their own civilians and 
military personnel. What this means is that we should not understand any 
opposition between protecting one’s own civilians and protecting other 
civilians. Following this logic, the loss of two enemy civilians to save a 
single civilian or military person is disproportionate. Second, the Golden 
Rule requires the attacking force to put themselves in the shoes of those 
on the receiving end and ask whether they would abide such an attack as 
legitimate. The purpose of such self-assessment is not simply to act as a 
check on excessive uses of force and the discounting of enemy civilian 
lives in relation to the lives of fellow citizens. Adhering to these principles 
is the only way to systematically abide by the principle of proportionality. 
For if military advantage is ultimately measured in numbers of lives saved, 
a coherent determination of excessive civilian casualties from an attack 
can only take place if foreign civilians are valued equally with fellow 
civilians and military personnel. The reason that the lives of fellow and 
foreign civilians should be valued equally is because the value of their 
lives derives from a feature common to both, ie their dignity, and not 
secondary considerations of citizenship or allegiance. Citizenship by itself, 
whether fellow or foreign, tells us nothing about whether we should 
guard the life of the person who possesses it. Because respect for life is 
both more fundamental and universal than citizenship and rests on the 
peculiarly human attribute of dignity, each life, whether fellow or foreign, 
should be valued equally.  
 
Beyond its usefulness in helping to clarify how lives should be valued, the 
further advantage of adopting these principles is that it forces military 
strikes to be contemplated in terms of actual outcomes in relation to the 
conflict at hand. Commanders should ask whether and by how much 
contemplated actions will shorten the conflict and save lives. The great 
advantage of this approach to proportionality is that it defines military 
advantage concretely, and does so such that military advantage and 
civilian casualties can be commonly measured in lives saved and lost.  
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I have argued that once military targets have been properly identified and 
distinguished from civilian targets, the military advantage of striking those 
targets should be assessed in terms of what can be reasonably claimed to 
shorten a war and save lives. Requiring an explicit focus on saving lives, 
particularly where enemy civilian lives are valued equally with fellow 
citizen lives, achieves the purposes of protecting civilians in conflict, 
holding parties to conflicts accountable for their actions, and enabling 
military commanders to direct their focus on the most valuable targets 
and thereby fight more effectively.  
 
 CONCLUSION V.
 
My focus on targeted killing highlights the extent to which proportionality 
analysis is centered on the common denominator of saving lives and can 
be carried out in an intelligent, data-driven manner. Because targeted 
killing consists of a pre-planned attack in a particular place against 
specific persons, a great deal of information can be assessed that may not 
be available ‘in the heat of battle.’ Targeted killings thus allow a more 
accurate application of proportionality supported by greater intelligence 
information. The fact that proportionality can be assessed more carefully 
and on the basis of more data in the targeted killing context does not, 
however, invalidate it as a model for more complex contexts such as 
asymmetrical conflicts or conventional wars. Although proportionality 
assessments in these other contexts may have to be made on the basis of 
less available information, the process and approach I have outlined 
should still serve to improve both the protection of civilian lives and the 
attainment of military goals. Every military should be interested in more 
effectively eliminating enemy threats and protecting and saving lives. By 
evaluating military advantage and proportionality in the light of all of the 
data at its disposal, militaries will fight shorter conflicts with fewer civilian 
casualties. 
